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A B S T R A C T   
The EU envisions itself as a global leader in sustainable fisheries governance. This paper explores how two key 
policies seek to implement these aspirations internationally – the Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) 
regulation and the Sustainable Fishing Partnership Agreements (SFPAs). We draw on case studies in Thailand and 
Senegal to examine the specific mechanisms through which the EU influences fisheries governance beyond its 
territory, respectively through the IUU regulation and SFPAs. Drawing on normative power literature, we argue 
that the EU utilises network and market modes of governance to translate normative environmental values into 
third country regulations as part of dialogue and negotiation processes. In particular, we expand on the func-
tioning of the network mode of governance by looking at how the EU has used socialisation and partnership 
approaches to promote certain values during its dialogues with both countries. In Thailand, the EU helped 
promote fisheries reform through its IUU yellow card mechanism, but its influence has at times been criticised as 
too directive. Meanwhile, the latest iteration of the EU’s bilateral fishing relations with Senegal under the new 
SFPA scheme shows promising improvement compared to previous versions, but remains complicated by the two 
countries’ relative power imbalance. Overall, our paper seeks to enrich the engagement of fisheries governance 
literature with questions of EU relations with third countries. Our two case studies demonstrate how exploring 
the functioning of normative aspects is significant particularly because the advancement of sustainability in 
global fisheries depends on concrete, historically complex, and multilaterally constructed power relations.   
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has long functioned as a key power in 
sustainable global ocean governance [8]. Through both rhetoric and 
policy instruments, it has sought to frame itself as a responsible and 
progressive actor in fisheries governance [2,57]. To do so, it has built on 
its influence as the world’s largest seafood market and on its exclusive 
competences for marine resources conservation, which enable and 
mandate it to negotiate on behalf of member states [1]. As a result, its 
external fisheries policies have consistently been promoted by the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries (DG MARE) as being part and parcel of a “new Europe” 
working at the service of normative global principles [2,43]. Taking a 
leading role in sustainable global oceanic governance remains a priority 
for the EU today. The Commission and DG MARE have framed the task of 
ensuring that the EU serves as a force that can “proactively promote 
sound ocean governance on a global scale […] by keeping its presence 
and strong voice in the UN, the FAO, and all the RFMOs [Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations]” as an explicit strategic objective 
in the 2016–2020 strategic plan ([13], 17). Normative values of envi-
ronmental sustainability have been translated into a wide range of the 
policies and market mechanisms under the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) and specifically the external aspects of its implementation in 
different parts of the world. 
Over the years, however, the EU has faced a wide range of criticism 
spanning both the CFP more generally and the normativity of its external 
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dimension in particular. Previous iterations of the CFP have been 
critiqued for disregarding scientific advice and promoting overcapacity 
and overfishing [38], while the latest reformed version of the policy has 
been said to promote opacity through its regionalisation policies [17]. 
Meanwhile, the extent to which the external dimension of this policy 
may promote positive norms across the world has faced doubt. In broad 
terms, for instance, Staeger [53] has criticised the underlying agenda of 
“Normative Power” Europe as propagating a flawed, universalist, and 
ultimately inadequate developmental approach. 
There have also been more specific criticisms concerning how the EU 
has been promoting fisheries governance beyond its waters, especially in 
developing countries [5]. Some analysts have pointed to EU fleets’ poor 
track record with sustainability and to its self-interest-led socialisation 
strategies [47], which have promoted the EU’s economic interests in 
resource extraction over its stated goals of poverty eradication in 
developing countries [8]. While critics recognise the value in develop-
mental aims incorporated in EU policies, they have also emphasised the 
need to consider historical power dynamics between the Global North 
and South and to critically examine whether partner countries benefit in 
terms of employment opportunities and competitiveness on the global 
market from their agreements with the EU [31]. 
With a few notable exceptions [2,36,41,47,56], the significance of 
normative power in international fisheries governance has been rela-
tively underexplored in fisheries policy literature. Most literature 
exploring the EU’s external fisheries policy has focused on the rule of 
law and its implementations [55] and emphasised the EU’s imple-
mentation of value and rules using trade [60,64]. The literature remains 
limited however on bringing forward the way in which the EU exercises 
and translates normative goals throughout its dialogue and agreement 
processes with developing countries. Yet, as the rhetoric we have cited 
demonstrates, international law norms like sustainability and being a 
responsible global actor form an important pillar of EU external fishing 
policy and inform its decisions in a number of policy instruments. Hence, 
our article addresses an important gap in fisheries governance literature 
and specifically literature dealing with the EU’s relations with devel-
oping countries. 
This paper examines how the EU exercises and translates normative 
power in its external fisheries policy through two key policy mecha-
nisms: Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing measures and 
Sustainable Fishing Partnership Agreements (SFPAs). To our knowledge, 
this exploratory paper is one of the first attempts to examine these two 
core EU external fisheries policies using the same conceptual lens of 
normative power analysis. Alongside the EU’s participation in RFMOs 
and other international organisations, as well as its wider efforts in trade 
and tariff setting, both policies have been framed by the European 
Commission and DG MARE as pillars of its aspirations to shape global 
ocean governance as “a driving force of sustainable fisheries and mari-
time affairs worldwide” ([13], 17). While the EU employs a range of 
measures to fulfil these aspirations, the IUU regulation and the SFPAs 
stand out as two key policy mechanisms directly intended to support the 
Commission’s normative agenda in external fisheries governance. On 
the global stage, the EU’s normative aspirations extend to a range of 
important norms, such as human rights and democracy. However, in this 
paper we focus on the core value of environmental sustainability in 
order to examine how and to what extent the EU has exercised green 
aspects of normative power during dialogues and negotiations with 
partner developing countries for these policy mechanisms. As we 
observe that the EU’s ‘ways of managing fish’ are woven through fish-
eries management in both Thailand and Senegal, in our conclusion we 
call for more in-depth studies on the detailed dialogue regarding fish-
eries agreements between the EU and third countries. 
2. Methodology 
Our paper draws on insights from two separately conceived and 
conducted original research projects, each based on a distinct case study: 
the first, an examination of the EU’s IUU measures in Thailand and the 
second, a study into the EU’s SFPA relations with Senegal. The decision 
to bring insights from these independent studies together for this paper 
arose after a discussion in which the authors noted intriguing thematic 
overlaps between their respective examinations of the EU’s external 
fisheries policies in each case context. Both studies had observed power 
asymmetries in the process of negotiating and implementing the un-
derlying policy mechanisms that framed third countries’ responses to-
ward the EU’s external fisheries governance. Therefore, we propose a 
normative power analysis as the conceptual lens to through which we 
explore our two case studies. The normative power analysis we propose 
in this paper consists of three steps: we examine, first, the norm-oriented 
aspirations of the EU; second, the different mechanisms (modes of 
governance) through which the EU advances these aspirations in its 
external fisheries relations; and third, the specific iterations of these 
mechanisms and their relative success respectively through the IUU 
Regulation in Thailand and the SFPA in Senegal. 
The project focusing on the EU-Thailand IUU dialogue bases its 
analysis on 22 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2019–20 on the 
average of one hour per interview, as well as reports and policy docu-
ments analysis and literature review. The informants, included gov-
ernment officers from EU and Thai government, international advocacy 
organizations, non-government organisations, donors, consultants and 
Thai boat owners, were selected as the core stakeholders who had been 
involved in the dialogue or were the recipients of its dialogue. The semi- 
structured interviews were conducted both face-to-face in Thailand and 
by phone. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, except for two 
interviews with Thai government officers, which were written up as 
fieldnotes. Interview questions were prepared according to categories of 
the informant. For instance, questions such as ‘what has been your and 
your organisation’s involvement in the EU IUU policy? What has been the 
everyday policy discussion on IUU at EU level in your experience? How does 
it work?’ were prepared for international advocacy organisation in-
formants. While there has been limited study on the EU’s IUU policy in 
Thailand to date (with the exception of [36,56]), the study drew on key 
reports and policy documents published between 2015 and 2020 in both 
Thai and English to discern the EU’s influence on Thai national fisheries 
implementations. 
The EU-Senegal SFPA case relied on critical discourse analysis of 
several dozens of policy and legal documents from EU archival and 
current legislation, as well as reports from third party organizations and 
media sources. This analysis builds on a previous discourse analysis 
study of the EU-Senegal fishing relations conducted in 2014–2015 [2]. 
In both rounds of discourse analysis, documents were selected for 
analysis through a purposive snowball sample approach [6]. Because of 
its stronger focus on the legal and policy history of the EU-Senegal SFPA 
relationship—but also due to funding and time constraints limiting its 
scope—this second study did not feature participant interviews in situ. 
Analysis of the EU’s normative aspirations, in particular in relation to 
questions of sustainability and human rights, guided this project through 
both rounds of examining discursive materials. 
Given the specificity of each research project, policy instrument, and 
geographical context, we take these two case studies as descriptive 
rather than representative (as per [63]) and as co-constructive and 
complementary for our overarching analysis rather than as directly 
comparable. The fact that our case studies originate from two separate 
research projects based on different methodologies—rather than from a 
project conceived and designed as a comparison from the start—is a 
definite limitation of our paper. We have mitigated this limitation by 
embracing a constructionist approach to our comparative analysis, 
accepting the dynamism and “procedural flexibility and dexterity” of 
our interpretative practice ([33], 700). As with most case-based quali-
tative work, the strength of our approach here is not in its repli-
cability—especially considering that qualitative case study work can 
never be exactly replicated—but instead in the approach’s explanatory 
potential [30]. While not designed in parallel to offer a traditional case 
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study comparison, the two contexts together nevertheless pointed to 
wider conclusions about the EU’s normative power aspirations in global 
fisheries policy, by offering insights on the potential success of, and 
challenges to, the EU’s normative goals. Since we believe that a 
comparative analysis of the EU’s normative power in external fisheries 
relations has not been attempted before, a constructionist approach is 
well-suited to this initial exploration. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section (3), we overview 
the external dimension of the EU’s CFP and more specifically the IUU 
Regulation and SFPAs as its key pillars. This section sets up the foun-
dation for our normative power analysis by revealing underlying green 
normative values in the policies mentioned. In Section 4, we move on to 
the second step of our normative power analysis by reviewing theoret-
ical literature on the different modes of governance that underpin the 
EU’s functioning as a global normative power. We then evaluate how the 
EU has applied its IUU Regulation to promote fisheries reform in 
Thailand (Section 5.1) and the history of the EU’s bilateral fishing re-
lations leading up to its SFPA with Senegal (Section 5.2). In Section 6, we 
take on the final step of normative power analysis by exploring how the 
EU’s different modes of governance have affected the success of local 
fisheries management and the EU’s relations with the partner country in 
both cases. Finally, we draw conclusions for the productive interchange 
between fisheries governance literature and normative power analysis, 
as well as offer recommendations for future research. 
3. The EU’s external fisheries policies 
The significance of the EU’s external governance has grown with the 
EU’s enlargements and treaty consolidations during the 2000s ([40, 
58]). The EU’s role as a global actor has a longer history, however. Its 
predecessor, the EEC, declared a strong legal competence in fisheries 
conservation with its signature to the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1998, and took an active part in the 
negotiations of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement [1]. The EU’s further 
consolidation and growth as an international actor since then has been 
reflected in the maritime realm. Over the last two decades, the EU has 
incorporated objectives of sustainable, ethical, and just ocean gover-
nance in both its internal and its external fishing and maritime policies 
[56]. These meta-objectives or norm-oriented aspirations are what we 
consider the first step to analyse normative power in fisheries, as they 
tend to be the main policy driver and motivate the actions within EU 
member states. 
A vision of the “oceans as a global challenge and priority” [65] and of 
the EU as a key actor in the effort to preserve the oceans was embedded 
in the latest CFP reform and its external dimension ([60], p. 4–5; [24], p. 
28). In particular, the CFP has been framed as one of several key policy 
instruments making the EU “well placed to shape international ocean 
governance on the basis of its experience in developing a sustainable 
approach to ocean management” ([65], 4) and the CFP itself sets out the 
objective for the EU to “seek to lead the process of strengthening the 
performance of regional and international organisations in order to 
better enable them to conserve and manage marine living resources 
under their purview” and to “cooperate with third countries and inter-
national organisations for the purpose of improving compliance with 
international measures, including combating IUU” ([24], preamble 
(50)). This determination of the EU to be a green leader in marine 
governance influences the way that its external fisheries policies are 
conceived and exercised. At the same time, given the normative nature 
of these commitments, the EU does not state clear indicators that would 
consistently and systematically evaluate when these objectives have 
been met. 
While these objectives support a vision of the EU as a positive global 
actor, to some extent they also represent self-interest, notably by 
ensuring a level playing field that preserves the EU’s competitiveness on 
the global market (see, for example, [24], preamble (50)). Additionally, 
EU identity politics are embedded within a wider historical context [29]. 
Domestic political processes, as well as conflicts between different in-
terest groups in the EU, have played an important role in shaping the 
EU’s actions as a green leader on the global stage [5,42]. For this paper, 
however, our focus is not on the internal dynamics influencing the policy 
and instead on the extent to which sustainability norms are integrated 
into the EU’s external marine resource governance. In particular, we 
focus on two illustrative case studies on two of the EU’s key policies from 
the external dimension of the CFP: IUU management and the SFPAs. 
3.1. EU IUU regulations 
IUU fishing is globally accepted as a core problem for marine re-
sources depletion. The UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
has attempted to address the growing problem of IUU fishing over two 
decades, but with limited market, control, or enforcement capabilities, it 
has not prevailed on third countries to comply with its International Plan 
of Action against IUU [18]. In 2010, the EU took the initiative of 
designing a specific regulation (EC Reg no. 1005/2008) to hold itself and 
external countries accountable on IUU fishing, particularly by limiting 
or outright preventing IUU products from entering the EU market [47]. 
The goal of this regulation is to ensure a full traceability of marine 
products entering the EU market through a catch certificate scheme. All 
coastal, flag, market and port states are expected to comply with the 
EU’s catch certification [18]. 
This means that flag states must certify that catches are legitimate 
during fishing, transhipping and landing. To achieve this goal, third 
countries need to commit to applying national and/or international 
conservation and management measures from fishing to packaging [22]. 
The EU uses a carding system to indicate which trade measures it can 
employ with third party countries suspected or known to export IUU 
fishing products: e.g. yellow card as a warning and red card as a com-
plete ban. This regulation applies to all nations trading with the EU. 
However, the regulation is implemented on a country-by-country basis 
([47], p. 138), which requires further unpacking on how green norms 
are interpreted and exercised. As of October 2020, eight countries are 
under yellow cards and three countries are under red cards. Thus, while 
the CFP ordinarily sets out rules and norms for EU vessels and third 
country vessels fishing in EU waters, the EU IUU regulation aims to in-
fluence and support sustainable practices for third country vessels 
fishing outside of EU waters ([18], p. 243). 
3.2. SFPAs 
The EU’s earliest bilateral fishing agreements with third-party 
developing countries—and direct predecessors of the current 
SFPAs—were concluded in the late 1970 s as a response to the estab-
lishment of EEZs through UNCLOS. The agreements derive their legal 
basis in international law from Article 62(2) and (3) of UNCLOS, which 
oblige coastal states to give other states access to any surplus of the 
allowable catch they are unable to harvest themselves (UNCLOS, 1982). 
The SFPAs are a specific subset of EU bilateral agreements for fishing 
access, conducted mainly with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, and designed to set out preferential conditions under which 
the EU fleet may access these third-party countries’ surplus catch (see 
[19], Article 3 (2); [64]). In this way, the SFPAs enable EU vessels to 
access the partner country’s waters and the surplus catch for a particular 
stock without negotiating a private agreement with that country. 
They are negotiated on an individual basis between the EU and each 
partner state, resulting in variations between the different agreements 
[60]. Each agreement is complemented by implementation protocols 
and EU vessels may only access waters under the jurisdictions of partner 
countries if the bilateral agreement in place also has an active protocol 
([25], preamble (19)). The protocols define the specific species fished by 
EU vessels, the number of EU vessels authorised to fish them, as well as 
the value and breakdown of the financial contribution. As of October 
2020, the EU has thirteen SFPAs with active protocols in force and an 
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additional seven so-called ‘dormant’ agreements without active pro-
tocols in place [27]. 
Over the years, the bilateral agreements have come under criticism, 
frequently of a type consistent with broader critiques of both the CFP 
and the EU as a normative power actor. The earliest agreements were 
initially implemented as an opportunity to export EU fishing over-
capacity well away from EU waters [51] and gave a substantial benefit 
to the EU over the partner developing countries [31]. In short, they were 
framed as straightforward “fish, pay, and go” trade mechanisms [2,31, 
61]. Partly in response to these criticisms, and partly as part of the EU’s 
own growing legal identity as a normative global power during the 
2000s [43], the agreements have been restructured twice as part of the 
2002 and 2012 reform cycles of the CFP [21,61]. In addition, some of the 
incentives motivating earlier criticisms seem to have weakened over the 
years - for example, in 2015 the Commission reported only 8% of EU 
catches to come from third-party EEZs [23], compared to 40 per cent in 
2009 [20]. Consequently, the agreements have come to incorporate an 
increasing range of normative principles, reflecting consistency with 
other trade, developmental, and environmental EU policies and broad 
diplomatic relations ([25], preamble (10); [23]). The current, “new 
generation”, of the SFPAs is intended by the Commission to be a 
“benchmark of transparent management of international fishing pol-
icies” conducted on the basis of fair negotiations and “contributing to 
inclusive development” [23]. To that end, as the case study of the 
Senegal SFPA will demonstrate, the latest iterations of the SFPAs include 
a range of new, previously absent provisions, including ones on 
combating IUU fishing. 
4. EU external modes of governing 
To better understand how the EU has functioned as an actor in global 
fisheries governance, we take on the second step of normative power 
analysis by exploring different governing mechanisms the EU employs to 
reach its aspiration of being a green actor. We take an inspiration from 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s [40] three modes of governance per-
formed by the EU during its negotiations with third party countries: 
hierarchical, market and network modes. Hierarchical governance, un-
derstood as a formalised relationship specifying dominant and subor-
dinate principles through enforceable rules [40], applies most often to 
relations between EU member states and institutions of the EU; however, 
this mode can also extend to certain cases of external governance, for 
example whenever the Commission negotiating on behalf of the EU 
makes reference to the EU’s exclusive competences or to European Di-
rectives that define its position. 
The market mode of governance derives from competition and trade 
leverage, including trade-for-access arrangements, trade dependencies, 
standard-setting and the inclusion of fisheries cooperation provisions in 
various trade agreements [12,60]. As the largest seafood market in the 
world, the EU holds considerable sway in international negotiations 
through this mode of governance [18]. The network mode is often based 
on mutual agreement and orientations around processes and in-
teractions. This mode shows how the EU’s strategic approach to influ-
encing governance beyond its territory has moved on from earlier efforts 
to restructure organisations and/or enforce regulations to an emphasis 
on encouraging cooperation and dialogue [39,40,44]. 
Finally, the network mode of governance, aligned with the concept 
of Normative Power Europe as defined by Manners [43,44], contrasts 
the ‘hard power’ approach involving hierarchical relations. The network 
mode of governance is characterised by ‘soft power,’ exerted especially 
through the promotion of different norms - that is, the setting of defi-
nitions or through redefining what is considered ‘normal’ in global 
politics [43]. Network governance shows how the EU flattens the hier-
archical order by applying governing mechanisms such as dialogue [14, 
44], market incentive [12], development assistance [2,41] and promo-
tion of certain principles [50]. 
Socialisation and partnership, two key aspects of the network mode 
of governance, are useful concepts to help explore our two cases. 
Through socialisation, the EU becomes a promoter of rules, norms, 
practices and structures of meaning, starting by ‘talking the talk’ to 
change the other actors’ social practices and dispositions to finally adopt 
or internalise desired practices in their institution or legal system ([7], p. 
7–8). Socialisation mechanisms are often based on voluntarist, 
participatory-based activities [39], and focus on an open-ended process 
of engagement and debate between EU and external actors ([44], 
p.238). The socialisation process also revolves around incentives and the 
exerting of funds through relevant development and cooperation pro-
jects. Such funds can motivate the third countries to step forward and 
integrate the EU’s suggestions into their own governance structure [41]. 
Partnership has become another common tool for the EU to promote 
equal relationships [44] and mutual advantages for both parties [48]. 
Instead of exerting pressure on certain standards applied by third 
countries, the EU uses relevant communication channels and formal and 
informal dialogues to encourage partner countries to foster institutional 
adaptation processes ([3], p. 416). However, the partnership does not 
always end up in a successfully collaborative term. Often, the third 
countries are not simply passive recipients, but can involve active pro-
cesses of interpretation, incorporation of new norms, and rules into 
existing institutions, and resist some rules that are not a good fit [7]. 
Scholars have observed, however, that the EU’s adoption of network 
governance alone is not effective without market pressure [3,18]. The 
EU’s role as the world’s largest seafood market plays a big part in this 
negotiation. The EU’s market power allows it to exercise influence by 
restricting market access or creating trade incentives. The market power 
can thus shape how the third countries manage their catches along the 
line of voluntary application of the EU sustainability system [14]. 
The distinction between market, network and hierarchical modes of 
governance can at times be fluid. By investigating how these modes 
function in the EU’s external fishing relations, respectively in a case of 
IUU regulation in Thailand and one of the SFPA with Senegal, we seek to 
highlight the relevance of these modes’ interplay for international 
fisheries governance and specifically for the capacity of actors like the 
EU to promote norms of sustainability through its influence. 
5. Two policies & two cases 
5.1. Thailand and EU IUU regulation case 
Unresolved problems of labour violations on fishing vessels and the 
continuation of IUU fishing practices in Thailand led to the EU issuing a 
yellow card, a warning card before sanction, to Thailand in 2015 [59]. 
The yellow card had a major impact on EU-Thailand seafood trade re-
lations, as Thailand drastically reduced its seafood exports to the EU 
from 265,000 tons in 2007 to less than 150,000 tons in 2015 [15]. The 
yellow card status also transformed a longstanding informal communi-
cation between EU and Thai governments into an official dialogue, led 
by DG MARE on the EU side and by the Department of Fisheries (DoF) on 
the Thai side. However, the dialogue also involved other authorities 
from both parties. For example, the Thai government established a 
centralised unit of the Command Center for Combating Illegal Fishing 
(CCCIF), to communicate across departments and ministries, reporting 
directly to the prime minister. On the EU side, DG EMPL was brought 
into the dialogue to discuss labour rights, with local support of the EU 
Bangkok office. 
The engagement between the EU and the Thai government priori-
tised first and foremost the improvement of Thai fisheries management 
and outdated fisheries law to make sure that the products are handled in 
a sustainable manner from source to EU market. According to interviews 
with EU officers, the EU had been communicating with DoF about the 
problem of IUU fishing in Thai water long before issuing the yellow card. 
After ‘talking the talk’ [7], where the EU pointed out the problematic 
issue of IUU fishing in the Thai fishing industry, the EU continued its 
socialisation strategy by working directly with the responsible 
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administrative unit, DoF. The strategy was to integrate certain sustain-
able values, in this case a well-functioning Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance (MCS) system for the fishing fleet and a comprehensive 
traceability system for seafood supply chains, into Thai fisheries man-
agement. An interview with a former EU officer revealed that the EU had 
worked directly with the Thai administration, to allow them to put the 
issue on the political agenda and make sure that legislation was adopted 
quickly. 
In practice, the normative values of sustainable fisheries manage-
ment were integrated through legal reform and intensive implementa-
tion. After four years of close technical advice and discussions between 
EU IUU and Thai DoF officials, Thailand passed The Royal Ordinance on 
Fisheries B.E. 2558 (2015) (Royal Ordinance hereafter) to replace 
Fisheries Act (2015), an amended version of Fisheries Act (1947), which 
had been long overdue [36,59]. Thirty-two Port-In/Port-Out (PIPO) 
Centres were established to carry out inspections of registered docu-
ments of vessels and fishworkers. The government set up Traceability, 
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) to monitor the movement of vessels 
larger than 30 tonnes through an e-registration system. These measures 
have amounted to a significant improvement in financial and human 
resources to fight IUU fishing. 
DG MARE officers placed themselves as a technical advisory unit to 
provide recommendations toward new regulatory frameworks during 
the Thai fisheries reform. Language of partnership was emphasised in 
interviews with EU representatives. According to EU officers, the EU was 
in the position to communicate how EU member states have successfully 
adopted IUU regulation to eliminate IUU fishing in its waters. Therefore, 
the implications of IUU regulation in external waters is for the EU to 
build ‘cooperation dialogue’ to help Thailand to fulfil its obligations of 
international law as a flag state, a market, and a coastal and a port state. 
The end result of EU-Thai dialogue was the lifting of the yellow card, 
with the EU announcing that ‘Thailand follows the ‘constructive coopera-
tion’ of Thai authorities with the Commission resulting in a comprehensive 
and structural reform of their fisheries legal and policy systems in order to 
curb illegal fishing’ [26]. By contrast, the EU consistently applies the term 
“non-cooperating” in official DG MARE statements referring to any third 
country on the receiving end of an IUU red card (EC Reg no. 1005/2008, 
Article 31). This shows that the partnership aspect of network mode has 
been integrated into DG MARE officers’ work with third countries at 
least on a discursive level in contexts where concrete measures have 
been put in place through a predetermined process and cooperative 
efforts. 
There are, however, some critiques about the EU’s socialisation 
strategies. For instance, some Thai government officers have questioned 
the sincerity of the EU ‘s partnership approach, claiming that the EU 
came to technical meetings with inspection eyes and dominated the 
agenda. Moreover, the cooperation dialogue has been limited only to 
state-to-state discussions. This means that other stakeholders had 
limited roles in the decision-making process and equally limited op-
portunities to raise their concerns during the reform. ‘We were invited to 
listen but not to speak’ was a reflection from an advisory for the 
Thailand Fisheries Association, whom the first author interviewed in 
2020. Although the advisory was invited to join several meetings during 
the reform, they could not raise any opinions. Boat owners and fisheries 
association members we interviewed during fieldwork in 2020 could not 
keep up with the regulatory changes in response to EU’s requests. This 
group of stakeholder have carried the cost of the reform, with very little 
influence over the new regulation. For example, boat owners were 
required to install VMS, register all fishworkers working on board and 
pay the workers via a banking system instead of cash. Before each fishing 
trip, boat owners need to notify PIPO and queue for inspection. Ac-
cording to the interviews, legalising and documenting the fishing 
operation and labour management have created extra cost to the 
owners. 
Despite these critiques, the partnership approach still allows the EU 
to bring to the table a workable solution on improved working 
conditions under trade measures. Further, the EU avoids hierarchy mode 
of governance by framing the IUU policy as emerging from international 
standards promoted by international organisations in the global arena. 
For instance, expert advice provided by DG MARE to Thailand was 
framed as being embedded in existing international frameworks, such as 
the International Law of the Sea and the FAO on the Port States Measures 
agreement. Therefore, the EU-led dialogue encouraged Thailand in 
voluntarily adopting these international frameworks into its national 
regulations. These voluntary governing techniques, although claiming 
to replace legal obligations [40], are relatively ineffective without the 
EU’s added external market pressure. 
Four years of intensive engagement between the two governments 
has resulted in the major and rapid regulatory reform in fisheries. The 
dialogue has established the monitoring system and brought the trace-
ability of catch to the forefront of the reform. While the EU has 
considered Thailand as a successful case in addressing IUU problems, 
Thailand itself also started to take on a leading role in the region by 
organising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Meet-
ings on Combating IUU Fishing in Partnership with the EU, twice in 
2019. However, since the yellow card was lifted in January 2019, the 
ongoing effectiveness of fisheries reform remains understudied. VMS 
and PIPO continued to be active during the first author’s last visit to 
Thailand in Feb-March 2020. However, the pandemic crisis has landed 
on top of the unfinished reform, which has resulted in not only the re-
striction of movement of fishworkers between provinces and national 
borders, but also the change in market demand of fresh seafood both 
domestically and internationally [46]. 
5.2. Senegal and SFPA case 
The case study of the EU-Senegalese fishing relations presents a 
helpful overview of the evolution of the EU’s commitment to promoting 
sustainability in the bilateral agreements through network and market 
governance. The 1979 agreement between Senegal and the EU (then the 
EEC) was “the first of its kind to be negotiated by the Community with a 
developing country” ([10], 1; [16]). Far from exemplifying network 
governance, however, this earliest agreement and its renewals received 
criticism as “pay, fish and go” arrangements leaving an overall negative 
impact on the health of West African waters and local artisanal fleets 
[35]. The EU was said to enjoy “considerable negotiating power” in 
setting these terms [61], especially as it negotiated access to the same 
fishing stocks case by case with a number of individual coastal states 
along the West African coast. In these early agreements, therefore, the 
market mode of governance, depending above all on the EU’s compet-
itive strength as the world’s leading fishing market, seemed more 
prominent. 
Network mode concerns like partnership and socialisation became 
more evident in the bilateral agreements after the 2002 CFP reform, 
when these instruments were renamed “fishing partnership agree-
ments”. The language of partnership, owing lineage to the 1975 
Lomé Convention and its successor, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, 
signalled commitment to ensuring equal agency of ACP countries in 
negotiations with the EU [52]. During its 2002–2006 fishing relations 
with Senegal, the EU followed up on its commitments by earmarking just 
under 20% of the compensation for partnership measures supporting 
Senegal’s capacity development [61]. However, analysis of the agree-
ment and its implementation at the time indicated an ongoing conflict 
between the EU’s network and market governance modes. Critics argued 
that the partnership measures were poorly implemented, highlighted 
that Senegal received little technological or scientific know-how [35], 
and suggested that the EU’s commitment to both network governance 
and sustainability remained rhetorical [61]. Analysts also emphasised 
the EU’s failure to call for scientific assessments prior to accessing the 
host country’s stocks [35] and highlighted EU fleets’ low levels of 
compliance on catch volume, as well as suspected engagement in IUU 
fishing [9]. 
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Thus, the success and sincerity of the partnership language came into 
question in the EU-Senegalese relations. Frustrations with these diffi-
culties were already evident throughout the negotiations leading up to 
the 2002–2006 protocol and seemed to play into the agreement’s 
eventual non-continuation after 2006 [54]. After 2006, no further pro-
tocols were concluded and the previous agreement remained inactive for 
eight years. 
In 2014, Senegal became the first country to negotiate and sign a 
bilateral fishing agreement with the EU under the agreements’ latest 
revised form as SFPAs after the 2012 reform of the CFP (Protocol, 2014, 
2; [27]). The current protocol for the agreement, valid until 2024, 
outlines fishing opportunities for highly migratory species (tuna) for 28 
freezer seiners and eight pole-and-line vessels and for deep-sea demersal 
species for two trawlers ([19], 1(1)), against a compensation estimated 
at nearly 14 million EUR ([19], 3(1)). This latest form of the agreement 
demonstrates higher commitments to network governance on the part of 
the EU. First, adjustments to the financial contribution from the EU seem 
intended to correct the impression of “pay, fish and go”. A higher pro-
portion of the payments than previously comes from authorisation fees 
payable by EU vessel owners themselves (Protocol, 3(2)) and a larger 
proportion – 750,000 EUR per year – has been earmarked as support to 
improve Senegal’s sectoral fisheries policy implementation (Protocol, 3 
(1.2)). 
In contrast to earlier versions of the agreement, the latest SFPA also 
reflects the EU’s growing commitment to ensuring sustainability. The 
agreement claims increased compliance monitoring and IUU prevention 
([19], 2(c)) that is further underwritten by specific measures like joint 
monitoring on the agreement’s application with respect to sustainability 
and fairness ([19], Article 7 & Protocol on Implementation, Article 5 
(2)). The protocol also steps up monitoring activities to a monthly basis 
once catch levels reach 80% of the pre-specified reference tonnage, 
moving to a daily basis with the introduction of electronic reporting 
(Protocol on Implementation, Article 3(4)). Finally, the EU has now 
explicitly recognised past loopholes exploited by its fleet. One of these 
involves the reflagging or chartering of member states’ fishing vessels or 
seeking “direct authorisations” from the partner countries outside the 
SFPA provisions in order to circumnavigate the agreements’ provisions 
(see [25], preamble 13). In response, the latest SFPA includes provisions 
that forbid the practice of “direct authorisation” ([19], 4 (2)) and an 
annex that details the process and details of obtaining authorisation 
under the SFPA (Ibid, Annex, Ch. II). 
While these measures show the EU’s stronger commitment to 
ensuring sustainability through network governance, they also reflect 
pressure on the EU to conform to norms, not only from critics or actors at 
home (whether in the form of observer criticism like [62] or internal 
calls for more transparency and stepped-up sustainability measures from 
within the [28]) but also from within partner countries themselves (see, 
for example, [11]). Just as the language of “partnership” originated from 
developing countries’ agency, so too the improved commitments to 
sustainability in the SFPAs come at least in part from host countries’ 
concerns with the health of their stocks and coastal communities. These 
countries’ negotiating power, however, remains limited. Although the 
SFPAs remain much more transparent than similar agreements 
concluded by other external fishing powers, each SFPAs is different from 
the others, suggesting that the EU still takes a deliberately ad-hoc 
approach to negotiating them that favours its commercial interests [60]. 
Meanwhile, statistical macroeconomic analysis has suggested that 
inactive fishing access agreements result in negative effects on the 
partner country’s trade performance, reducing its trade volume and 
overall exporting capacity [32]. While this analysis suggests that SFPAs 
have a positive effect on developing countries’ exports, it also hints that 
the agreements could cultivate market dependence in the host countries. 
Earlier criticisms that the EU’s presence undermines traditional 
employment and even erodes local economic development [4,31] also 
continue to be raised for the latest iteration of the agreements [34]. 
From a postcolonial perspective, the SFPA has also been seen to 
reinforce a long-term pattern of colonial and later neoliberal develop-
ment undermining the local societal fabric and traditional types of 
fishing labour [34]. The EU has sought to correct this perspective 
through increasing its development contributions to improve the local 
fishing sector, but reports on the success of these measures to strengthen 
local capacity and mitigate historic power asymmetries have been 
mixed: for example, interviewed in 2010 and 2015, and thus potentially 
reflecting early experiences from the newest SFPA protocol, in-
terlocutors in Jönsson’s research claimed that fishing by EU vessels 
displaces local fishing labour, particularly younger fishermen, and re-
inforces patterns of outward migration (2019). Although not directly 
tied to the SFPA’s sustainability measures, this criticism highlights the 
remaining limitations that countries like Senegal face when negotiating 
fishing relations with the EU. Such lingering power imbalances indicate 
the difficulty in employing network governance against a complex his-
torical context. Indeed, given the unquantifiable nature of power 
asymmetries in trade negotiations, this is an aspect difficult to address 
directly by indicators or other forms of measure that could potentially be 
set up to evaluate policy success. The success of network governance, 
therefore, must always be understood against the historical context in 
which it is applied. 
6. Analysis 
In this section, our insights from the Thailand and Senegal cases 
provide a lens to understand how the EU exercises and translates 
normative environmental goals of fisheries sustainability in its bilateral 
dialogue and agreement negotiations through network and market 
modes of governance. Within fisheries governance, the EU has moved 
away from relying predominantly on market influence in third coun-
tries, to emphasising collaboration and partnership activities. Network 
governance is not a straightforward process, however. Socialisation and 
partnership techniques have allowed the EU to bring certain green 
norms forward and to maintain its influence in the dialogue process. The 
outcomes of each dialogue therefore vary depending on how third 
countries are able to respond and position themselves during the pro-
cess. The effectiveness of the network mode of governance is arguably 
inseparable from market governance in both of our cases. On the one 
hand, market power can be rather a straightforward governing mecha-
nism in conjunction with network governance in the case of IUU catch 
certificates. On the other hand, market governance may at times 
contradict the network governance, as in the case of the SFPA. 
Network mode of governance, or normative power governance, is an 
important factor in how the EU approaches its relations with both 
countries and in both types of legislation. Rhetoric from the EU consis-
tently emphasises the derivations of the IUU regulation and the SFPAs 
from international laws, norms, and commitments. To avoid accusations 
that it is setting trade tariffs, the EU argues that the IUU regulation relies 
on already existing international regulations, conventions, and best 
practices. This genuine approach of conforming to the existing inter-
national laws has made the EU IUU regulation an effective tool in global 
fisheries governance. Similarly, as the SFPAs are based in UNCLOS EEZ 
regulations, the EU stresses how their norms come from international 
agreements, conventions, and best practices. The legitimacy of the EU as 
a global actor already relies heavily on international law and norms [43] 
and the strengthened competence of its institutions derives from mem-
ber state citizens’ support of supranational norms including sustain-
ability [37]. A straightforward interpretation, therefore, is that the EU 
uses best practices to align with international regulatory frameworks 
and legitimise its role as an international actor in promoting sustainable 
fisheries practices rather than exerting its own standards. 
Both case studies illustrate the extent to which partnership language 
has become a powerful political tool for the EU to influence and shape 
bilateral dialogue. Thailand has been praised by the EU for having 
‘constructive cooperation’, which put Thailand in a leading position 
within the region in combating IUU fishing. The EU took on an advisory 
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role and argued for a fruitful collaboration, circumventing the real re-
striction of catch certificate for products entering the EU market. The 
Senegal case, meanwhile, demonstrates how the language of partnership 
has been co-constructed and is continually employed by both sides. 
Through the agreement protocol’s gap years (2006–2014) and the 
subsequent negotiation leading up to the new SFPA, Senegal partici-
pated along with the EU in constructing language and declaring intent 
for more equal partnership relations. At the same time, postcolonial 
criticisms remind us that language of partnership may still fail to reflect 
a more complicated reality in which historical difference continue to 
impact each partner’s negotiating power [34]. 
Our two case studies also demonstrate how patterns of socialisation 
further complicate the partnership process. Overall, the EU has posi-
tioned itself as an expert, which influences and leads the actual process 
of learning or co-creating of knowledge. The knowledge in focus is 
therefore fisheries sustainability as interpreted by the EU. For example, 
the focus on the implementation of catch certification scheme under the 
EU IUU regulation has positioned ‘traceability’ as one of important 
criteria for sustainability in EU fisheries management. This means that 
catch certification becomes a dominant feature to discuss during the 
dialogue. When expertise and knowledge become the key element in 
bilateral dialogue, EU takes a dominant position, which leads to asym-
metric network governance [39]. For both the EU IUU and SFPA di-
alogues, therefore, the third country’s ability to claim equal partnership 
in this conversation depends on its government’s capacity to proactively 
provide good benchmarks for best local practices [39]. 
In the IUU policy’s case, the EU has claimed expertise by defining 
IUU fishing and problematising IUU fishing in global fisheries. There-
fore, the IUU bilateral dialogue becomes a space for the EU to promote 
its normative values internationally by influencing what is considered 
acceptable to do to address IUU fishing. The Thai government played an 
active role, insofar as the yellow card provided it with a reason to 
implement rapid fisheries management reform. At the same time, 
Thailand’s contribution to the dialogue was impoverished by the lack of 
involvement of key domestic actors during the reform, which may un-
dermine the long-term success of its implementation. Similarly, the EU- 
Senegal SFPA dialogue has supported Senegalese government priorities 
but not always represented the full range of local interests when 
debating notions of development or sustainability. In these relations, the 
EU’s scientific expertise and technical advice serve as the benchmark 
and support for Senegal’s fishing sector development at least partly as-
sumes that the EU has better knowledge of what sustainable fishing 
governance should look like. In reality, this socialisation leaves the 
initiative for defining problems much more with the EU and may result 
in important issues becoming overlooked in the negotiations – as 
exemplified by claims that the presence of EU fleets has undermined the 
local labour market. 
Finally, the two cases also demonstrate an ongoing tension between 
market and network governance in the EU’s external fishing relations as 
part of these two policy instruments. The tension exists because, as 
Zimmermann has remarked, it is “extremely hard to reconcile” ([64], 
136), on the one hand, the need of securing EU access to sufficient 
fishing product (in the case of the IUU) and to sufficient fishing oppor-
tunity (in the case of the SFPA) and, on the other hand, the normative 
objectives of ensuring global sustainable fishing. For instance, Senegal’s 
potential market dependency on the export toward the EU may have 
limited the extent to which it would have been able to negotiate an 
agreement on equal terms. Similarly, lingering criticisms about the EU’s 
presence undermining local artisanal fisheries [34] further highlight the 
potential tensions with the partnership language. While Thailand 
welcomed support from the EU on IUU regulation in the country, the 
major reforms implemented by Thailand was carried out in the hope, 
soon achieved, that the Thai industry would continue to be able to sell 
fish in the EU. Therefore, EU induces Senegal and Thailand to adopt 
certain policies and ideas by using both positive (rewards) and negative 
(sanctions) incentives ([47], p. 139). For us, our analysis in this section 
has provided a clear final step to analyse EU normative power, where 
certain EU fisheries values are made visible throughout the interaction 
processes between EU and the third countries. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we visited two case studies demonstrating how 
different modes of governance enable or complicate the EU’s ability to 
promote sustainability through its external fishing relations. Focusing 
on EU-Thailand IUU negotiations and EU-Senegal SFPA development, 
we expanded especially on the role that network governance and its 
mechanics play for the EU’s fishing relations with developing countries. 
It is worth noting that, because our case studies originated from separate 
research projects and were not designed specifically with this compar-
ison in mind, our analysis is more limited than it could have been given 
dedicated research design. Future research projects on EU fisheries 
external policies may be stronger if they were initially designed specif-
ically for the comparison. Nevertheless, our exploratory paper does 
point to several key points on the potential and the limits of the EU’s soft 
power in its external fishing policies. Indeed, in our view, analysing the 
two case studies from a joint normative power analytical lens contrib-
utes directly to fisheries governance literature. While in this way our 
findings also speak directly to scholarly literature on Normative Power 
Europe, they also have wider implications that could be applied to 
different contexts. Thus, we believe that the normative power analysis 
we have utilised in this paper could be usefully replicated by others as a 
conceptual approach. In this final section, we draw out some of these 
conclusions and reflect on the possibilities for future research to take 
them further. 
Firstly, our paper expands on a wider conversation in EU fisheries 
policy, which has traditionally focused more closely on the agency of 
internal member states and other European-based actors [42]. 
Compared to the broad literature examining in detail how EU fisheries 
governance functions within the EU itself, there has been less scholar-
ship looking in detail at EU fisheries governance beyond its borders. Our 
case studies and analysis help to address that by showing attention to 
two pillars of the EU’s self-defined role as a sustainability leader in 
fisheries: the IUU regulation and SFPAs. Without such in-depth studies 
of the EU’s implementation of these regulations outside EU waters, the 
claim that the EU has become a global actor in sustainability cannot be 
substantiated. Indeed, future research might pursue in more depth as-
pects of these policies that our paper has only briefly touched upon, for 
example by studying the EU’s inclusion of local stakeholders throughout 
its negotiations of its overarching external fisheries policy agenda or 
investigating on-the-ground interviews with the marginalised groups 
who may receive impact from EU’s fisheries policies. Future scholarship 
may also focus on contexts where the EU’s IUU and SFPA policies 
overlap, for instance by tracing emerging concerns about the sustain-
ability of EU fishing in Sierra Leone, which remains under the EU yellow 
warning card while the two parties negotiate for a SFPA [49]. 
Secondly, our paper adds to fisheries governance literature by of-
fering more detail on the normative processes and relations between the 
EU and third countries, rather than on the more frequently explored 
questions pertaining to the rule of law and trade measures. The two 
cases bring out the nature of power and actorness [45] in the EU’s 
fishing relations with third countries. The socialisation and partnership 
processes, in particular, help highlight the power asymmetry between 
the EU and third countries. In the Thai case, Thailand has positioned 
itself as a constructive collaborator during the dialogue, but our findings 
suggest that the EU has often taken an inspector rather than equal 
partner role during the dialogue. In the case of Senegal, even as the 
concept and language of partnership has increasingly become more 
prominent in EU-Senegal fishing relations, our analysis highlights the 
enduring complications of the postcolonial and historical context in 
which this partnership operates. To avoid future power asymmetry, we 
emphasise the importance for both the EU and third countries to bring 
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mutual objectives into the dialogue. Moreover, both parties should open 
the dialogue to external key stakeholders and public debate. This may 
result in a more positive response from actors who would be the re-
cipients of any negative impacts from the reform. Besides, both the EU 
and countries negotiating with it could focus more on collaborative 
scientific studies to highlight evidence-based analysis for their specific 
context. 
Thirdly, by examining the EU’s claims and policies, we also raise a 
broader debate about the ways in which normative aspects of interna-
tional relations can impact sustainability in global fisheries governance. 
Accordingly, our paper also contributes to Normative Power Europe 
literature. Corresponding scholarship in that sub discipline has taken up 
the case of fisheries more often in recent years (Zimmermann, 2019; 
[60]). Nevertheless, fishing as a topic that can shed further light on the 
functioning of Normative Power Europe remains relatively rare in in-
ternational relations and common market studies literature. Our ex-
amples add directly to this debate, but also expand the conversation 
further by showing how normative power, particularly with respect to 
the EU’s promotion of sustainable principles, is exercised and inter-
preted on the ground. We demonstrate how this type of “power” is in fact 
not unidirectional but is instead continually negotiated and contested 
between the EU and its partner countries. In this way, we highlight the 
importance for future research to examine the power asymmetries in 
fisheries negotiations without resorting to “colonial power vs. colon-
ised” dichotomies and instead by allowing the empirics to disclose the 
narrative of power relations in each context. Hence, our findings support 
future scholars in both fisheries research and EU normative power 
literature wishing to critically examine underlying and hidden processes 
of power associated with the implementation of concrete policies in 
context but at times overlooked by policy analysis on the ground. 
At the same time, our exploration of the Thailand IUU and Senegal 
SFPA relations show that the network mode of governance, as a core 
principle in translating EU normative power on the ground, cannot exist 
independently of the market mode of governance due to the situatedness 
of the IUU regulation and SFPAs within broader global market mecha-
nisms and the EU’s overall positioning in world politics. This analysis 
unpacks some of the ways in which the EU functions as a green 
normative power actor in the international arena. We have shown not 
only that the EU’s normative governance is multifaceted but also that 
promoting sustainability on the global scene can depend on specific, 
historically complex and multilaterally constructed, power relations. In 
this sense, the significance of our research transcends the EU itself. 
Future studies might well explore how actors other than the EU employ 
the varying modes of external governance in order to promote specific 
norms in their international fishing relations. Indeed, we can envision 
future scholars taking on normative power analysis as a conceptual lens 
for exploring fisheries policies in other parts of the world. 
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